Background: What Is the Sabarimala Reference 2026?

The Sabarimala Reference 2026 is one of the most consequential constitutional proceedings in India's recent judicial history. It originates from the Supreme Court's landmark 2018 verdict in Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, where a five-judge bench, by a 4:1 majority, struck down the centuries-old custom barring women aged 10 to 50 from entering the Sabarimala temple in Kerala's Pathanamthitta district.

The 2018 judgment rested on the premise that denying entry based on a woman's age — rooted in the temple deity Lord Ayyappa's status as a celibate deity — violated Articles 14 and 15 (right to equality and non-discrimination) as well as Article 25 (freedom of conscience and religion). The verdict sparked nationwide protests.

In November 2019, the Court heard review petitions but declined to reverse the 2018 ruling. Instead, it reframed the dispute as a vehicle for examining seven larger constitutional questions — including the meaning of "essential religious practices," the scope of Article 26, and the limits of judicial morality — and referred these to a larger bench, leading to the current Sabarimala Reference 2026 hearings.

The nine-judge bench that began hearing the reference on April 7, 2026 includes CJI Surya Kant alongside Justices B.V. Nagarathna, M.M. Sundresh, Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Aravind Kumar, Augustine George Masih, Prasanna B. Varale, R. Mahadevan, and Joymalya Bagchi.

Day 8 Argument: The Article 25 Custom Shield

On April 23, 2026 — the eighth day of hearings — Senior Advocate Arvind Datar appeared for parties opposing the entry of women of menstruating age to the temple. His central argument in the Sabarimala Reference 2026 was both textually ambitious and constitutionally significant.

Datar argued that Article 25(2) of the Constitution contains the following saving clause: "Nothing in this Article shall affect the operation of any existing law." He contended that the phrase "existing law" — when read alongside Article 13(3), which explicitly defines "law" to include customs and usages — must also encompass pre-constitutional religious customs. If so, the Sabarimala entry restriction, as an established pre-constitutional custom, would be constitutionally preserved against challenge under Article 25 itself.

This argument, if accepted, would constitute a dramatic constitutional shield for religious denominations: it would mean that any custom in existence before January 26, 1950 — the date the Constitution came into force — would be insulated from Article 25 challenge, regardless of whether it discriminates on grounds of gender.

Senior Advocate K. Radhakrishnan, appearing for the Pandalam royal family (hereditary trustees of a temple dedicated to Lord Ayyappa), raised additional concerns, asserting that petitioners seeking women's entry had made "scurrilous and denigrating" remarks about Lord Ayyappa. "Religious rights," he argued, "cannot be viewed from a non-believer's standpoint." Senior Advocate Jayant Muthuraj, representing female devotees who support the restrictions, went further: courts, he argued, should not interfere with a religious denomination's sincerely held beliefs.

Where the Nine-Judge Bench Divides

The Day 8 hearing was remarkable not merely for the argument itself but for the visible split it produced on the bench. For the first time in the Sabarimala Reference 2026, judges began signalling their preliminary leanings publicly.

The Textual Battle: "Existing Law" vs. "Law"

At the core of the Day 8 debate is a deceptively simple linguistic distinction that carries enormous constitutional weight. Justice Nagarathna's intervention crystallised the problem precisely.

Article 13(3)(a) defines "law" broadly: it includes "any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law." Custom is therefore "law" for the purpose of Article 13's void-if-inconsistent-with-fundamental-rights mechanism. Datar's argument was that this same broad definition should apply when Article 25(2) says "existing law."

Justice Nagarathna's counter was textual and elegant. Article 366(10) — the Constitution's own internal dictionary — defines "existing law" as "any law, Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, or regulation passed or made before the commencement of this Constitution by any Legislature, authority, or person having power to make such a law." Notice what is absent: there is no mention of customs or usages. If the framers had wanted "existing law" to include customs, they could easily have said so in Article 366(10) — just as Article 13(3) does for the plain word "law."

Datar's response was to insist on the broader reading, arguing the framers intended Article 25(2) to protect an expansive category of pre-constitutional practices. But the textual gap remains — and it is significant enough that two judges on the bench flagged it as a genuine obstacle to accepting the argument.

This dispute connects to a broader debate in Indian constitutional law about the essential religious practices doctrine — first articulated in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282. That doctrine asks whether a practice is essential to a religion before granting it constitutional protection. Datar's argument, if accepted, would sidestep that doctrine entirely for pre-constitutional customs — no essentiality test required.

Key Constitutional Provisions Explained

Case Timeline: From 1991 to 2026

Implications: What Hangs in the Balance

The Sabarimala Reference 2026 is not merely about one temple. The nine-judge bench is also tagged with petitions concerning the exclusion of Muslim women from mosques (the Yasmeen Zuber Ahmad Peerzade v. Union of India case) and the practice of female genital cutting among the Dawoodi Bohra community. Each of these turns on the same constitutional pivot as Sabarimala: can the Court test a religious practice for conformity with fundamental rights?

The Solicitor General Tushar Mehta — appearing for the Union of India — has posed a rhetorical challenge to those who would insulate all religious practice from judicial scrutiny: a Court that categorically refuses to examine religious custom would, he argued, have had no constitutional basis to abolish sati. The point is uncomfortable — and deliberate.

Senior Advocate Gopal Subramanium, appearing for the temple's Thantri (the hereditary vedic head who sets ritual rules), argued that courts must tread carefully: even practices that are not "essential" to a religion may deserve respect if they are long-standing denominational traditions. At the same time, he acknowledged that genuinely harmful superstitious practices can legitimately be regulated.

Article 26's protection of denominational autonomy — the right of religious groups to manage their own affairs — adds yet another dimension. Even if the Court finds that Article 25(2) does not categorically shield customs, a denomination may still argue that regulating temple entry intrudes on its Article 26 rights. The bench must eventually navigate both provisions simultaneously.

For a deeper understanding of how the essential religious practices doctrine has evolved in Indian courts, see our analysis: The Essential Religious Practices Doctrine: From Shirur Mutt to Sabarimala.

Frequently Asked Questions

What Comes Next

Arguments before the nine-judge bench have already run past the scheduled April 22, 2026 close date, underscoring the depth and complexity of the questions before the Court. The bench still needs to complete submissions on all seven constitutional questions before it can begin deliberating.

When the verdict does arrive, it will rank among the most consequential in the Supreme Court's history on the relationship between religious freedom, gender equality, and constitutional morality. For the first time, India's apex court will have a definitive nine-judge answer to the question that has divided scholars, judges, and citizens alike: does the Constitution protect faith from the Constitution itself?

Follow our Sabarimala reference coverage hub for live hearing updates, judgment analysis, and expert commentary as the case concludes.